



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1053
20 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF INDONESIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, I wish to recall that the Eleventh Ministerial Conference of the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, held at Cairo from 31 May to 3 June 1994, adopted a Final Document (see A/49/287-S/1994/894, annex, sect. I). In that connection, I have the honour to draw your attention, in your capacity as President of the Security Council for month of September, particularly to the decision concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, as contained in paragraph 147 of the Final Document, the text of which is attached (see annex).

I would greatly appreciate it if you could arrange to have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council for its consideration. I am confident that you will take the appropriate measures in this regard.

(Signed) Witjaksana SOEGARDA
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

Annex

Paragraph 147 of the Final Document of the Eleventh Conference
of the Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned Countries, held at
Cairo, from 31 May to 4 June 1994

Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

147. The Ministers welcomed the acceptance by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya of United Nations Security Council resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992 and reiterated the hope that the parties concerned would find a peaceful and just settlement that would secure the interests and rights of all parties in accordance with the norms of international law and the principles of the Charter of the United Nations. They expressed concern over the negative consequences of the continuation of the crisis on the Libyan people, the neighbouring countries and the region. They called on the parties concerned to refrain from any action that would result in escalation and to settle the crisis in a peaceful and speedy manner, in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. They welcomed and upheld resolution No. 5373 dated 27 March 1994 of the League of Arab States and urged the Security Council to take the new proposal it contained into consideration with a view to arriving at a peaceful and just settlement.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1994/1054
14 September 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 13 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The current threat of the use of force by the United States of America and its preparations for the invasion of Haiti, using to that end the Security Council and its resolutions as a cover for its policy of aggression towards Haiti, constitute a grave precedent that threatens international peace and security, a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, blatant intervention in the internal affairs of States and a threat to their security and independence. What is taking place in Haiti is an internal affair of the people and Government of Haiti and does not constitute a threat to or breach of the peace, nor is it an act of aggression justifying the use of force.

Accordingly, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya condemns all the endeavours and preparations under way for the invasion of Haiti and affirms that it is opposed to the United States' use of the Security Council as a cover for the invasion of that country. It regards that as a grave precedent, a violation of international instruments and custom, blatant intervention in the internal affairs of States and a threat to their security and safety and, consequently, a threat to international peace and security.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ali Sunni MUNTASSER
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires, a.i.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1055
14 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SLOVENIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Referring to the letter dated 8 July 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the president of the Security Council (S/1994/811), I have the honour to present the views of the Republic of Slovenia concerning certain elements contained in the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee on the activities of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ibid, annex).

Under section III C of their report, the Co-Chairmen deal with a study on confidence-building and security measures which was commissioned from the Institute for Security Studies of the Western European Union. The study contains a number of ideas which require careful reflection. Thus, according to the study, the five successor States of the former Yugoslavia would be brought to accept the confidence- and security-building measures, which would need to go beyond the measures already agreed to in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in order to satisfy the security needs of all the Yugoslav successor States and their neighbours. Further on, the study advocates that the first round of negotiations on control and verification measures be held within the framework of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia and involve only the successor States.

Security in the region is one of the most vital interests of the Republic of Slovenia. In this connection, Slovenia wishes to reiterate that any confidence- and security-building arrangements should be governed by the pertinent basic principles. In particular, the definition of the area of application of such arrangements should take into account relevant facts and ought not to be based on such irrelevant notions as the references to the "former Yugoslavia", a country that has ceased to exist. Former Yugoslavia is not a region.

It does seem to be necessary that those successor States of the former Yugoslavia that are involved in the armed conflicts make the arrangements needed for the establishment of peace and for post-conflict peace-building. The Republic of Slovenia, on the other hand, is not involved in any armed conflict.

S/1994/1055
English
Page 2

We would, however, be ready to participate in the arrangements agreed to by all States of the region, including Slovenia, and not only the States on territory that used to be part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Furthermore, successful functioning of the relevant regional regime requires that the commitments of participating States are entered into on the basis of their free agreement. In this connection, Slovenia emphasizes the relevance of the guidelines and recommendations for regional approaches to disarmament within the context of global security adopted by the Disarmament Commission (A/48/42, annex II) and endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 48/75 G of 16 December 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Danilo TÜRK
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERALS/1994/1056
14 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE
PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon the instructions of my Government and the President of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we would like to clarify any misunderstanding regarding our position with respect to the applicability of Security Council resolution 713 (1991) to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the impact of this issue on the role of the Contact Group, the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and related factors.

The Contact Group (France, Germany, Russian Federation, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America) have committed themselves to a course of action in the event of a Serbian-side rejection of the Contact Group's peace plan. This set of steps, most essentially, included: (a) intensifying the sanctions regime against Serbia/Montenegro and its proxies within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia; (b) enhancing the safe areas/exclusion zones and their protection; and (c) effectively lifting the de facto arms embargo against the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Karadzic Serbs have rejected the Contact Group's peace plan, and we now wait for the Contact Group to proceed with the measures it has committed itself to.

Contrary to erroneous or misleading reports, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina fully supports and expects the Contact Group to fulfil the measures it has committed itself to, including in particular the lifting of the de facto arms embargo. We have no doubts about the necessary course of action. Certainly, no other options have been offered to overcome the unacceptable status quo and make the Contact Group's peace plan a reality.

The request for the Security Council to clarify that the arms embargo imposed by resolution 713 (1991) does not apply to the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a conditional request. Our position that UNPROFOR and NATO, as well as the Contact Group, have an ongoing positive role in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina is based on the basic position that the measures the Contact Group has committed itself to are all part of a continuing process to realize the Contact Group's peace plan and that the

lifting of the arms embargo does not produce a point of divergence in objectives; to the contrary, there is a further confluence of efforts, as follows:

(a) UNPROFOR's mandate within the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was never predicated upon the maintenance of the de facto arms embargo upon the legitimate Government and defender of the civilian population. Most accurately, UNPROFOR's mandate can be characterized as assisting the humanitarian needs of, and helping to protect, the besieged civilian population, a mandate most consistent with a legitimate Government fully enabled to carry out the same responsibilities. UNPROFOR's mandate has never been, at least not yet, a peace-keeping mission since there has not been a peace to keep;

(b) Many of the UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations have directed a strategy in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina that so far has not only failed, but was also explicitly based on maintaining the arms embargo on both the victim and the aggressor, on the legitimate Government and the self-declared ethnic separatists. This policy has had disastrous consequences over the short term as well as those that still persist in the handicap it has inflicted upon the Government. These nations, including some members of the Contact Group, cannot now just simply claim no further responsibility since they in large part are accountable for the current situation. The legal and moral obligation of UNPROFOR and the international community to the safe areas is particularly unavoidable. (The safe areas were created specifically in lieu of either a more resolute response to the persistent Serbian aggression or the lifting of the de facto arms embargo.) Furthermore, the defenders of Srebrenica and Zepa were actually disarmed by UNPROFOR, which then destroyed the surrendered weapons;

(c) While some UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations may wish to withdraw in the event of a lifting of the de facto arms embargo, other troop contributors have indicated a willingness to stay and/or provide additional troops under such circumstances. Many UNPROFOR troop-contributing nations have advocated the position that UNPROFOR's mandate needed to be strengthened, in the direction of peacemaking, in order to confront the ongoing Serbian aggression, and systematic violations of humanitarian law and various United Nations resolutions, and to give peace a real opportunity to succeed. Many of these nations also evaluate the lifting of the arms embargo as consistent with this new international resolve towards the Serbian side. The views and commitments of these partners in UNPROFOR cannot be swept aside by those who wish to "abandon ship" at this critical time, a ship that they have so far piloted;

(d) Having accepted the Contact Group's peace plan and having all along sought to cooperate with the international political, humanitarian and military efforts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be received as an ally of the Contact Group in the efforts to bring peace. The Karadzic Serbs' rejection of the peace plan and the triggering of certain measures as a consequence of that rejection cannot allow either the United Nations, UNPROFOR, NATO or the Contact Group to disassociate itself from either the political, humanitarian or military efforts to find peace. To the contrary, having brought us to this new critical stage, rather than withdrawing from the situation, the Contact Group members as well as the United Nations and NATO should intensify their efforts in coordination with the Government that has

accepted the peace plan. Having made difficult and painful concessions for peace and, in particular the Contact Group's peace plan, the Government should not be faced with a new ultimatum: i.e. to choose between either the lifting of the arms embargo and the means to defend all its population and country or, in the alternative, the continuing commitment of the Contact Group (through UNPROFOR or NATO) to protect the safe areas, even those that were disarmed.

Therefore, rather than disassociating itself from the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Contact Group, as the spearhead of an international drive, and in concert with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, should further intensify efforts to compel the Serbian side genuinely to accept the Contact Group's peace plan. In this context, it is essential that the Contact Group execute its commitment to lifting the de facto arms embargo as well as other constructive steps including:

(a) Enhancing and intensifying the enforcement of the sanctions regime with respect to Serbia/Montenegro and its proxies in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia as called for in the action plan of the Contact Group. (Any favourable consideration that may be given to recent statements by the leadership of Serbia/Montenegro must be evaluated in their sincerity and commitment by the willingness of the Serbian/Montenegrin regime to allow for: (a) effective border monitoring; (b) recognition of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and (c) cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia);

(b) Enhancing the enforcement of and expanding the exclusion zones as called for by the action plan of the Contact Group. Ideally, the exclusion zones should be consistent with the territory allocated to the Federation under the Contact Group's peace plan;

(c) Ensuring that the mission of UNPROFOR (or a newly constituted substitute force) reflects both a heightened concern for security and a necessary resolve for peacemaking. While the position of UNPROFOR, or the substitute force, may be militarily consolidated, it can still carry out some important commitments to maintain and facilitate peace, including the more successful effort in central Bosnia. As for the "eastern enclaves", because UNPROFOR and the international community not only designated these regions as safe areas but also disarmed the defenders, the international community is morally and legally obligated to continue with its responsibility and/or to coordinate with the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina the return of this responsibility to the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The international community must make the choice and then ensure the orderly transfer of this responsibility, if necessary. For our part, we remain willing and ready to cooperate either by minimizing the risk to the continued presence of UNPROFOR, or the substitute force, in the eastern enclaves through demilitarization or by assuming in an orderly fashion, an increasingly greater responsibility for the "safe areas" and the humanitarian efforts over all;

(d) NATO, through the strategy of "air-to-group support" and "exclusion zones" can be especially instrumental in deterring attacks upon UNPROFOR or the existing or newly defined safe areas.

May I ask for your kind assistance in circulating this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Muhamed SACIRBEY
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1057
15 September 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and with reference to the letter dated 7 September 1994 addressed to you by the representative of the Iraqi regime (S/1994/1052), I should like to state that this matter has absolutely no basis in fact and that the competent authorities in Kuwait have no information regarding the two Iraqi boys whose names are given in the above-mentioned document.

Furthermore, we should like to state that no Kuwaiti police patrol operates behind the earthen embankment near the boundary line between Kuwait and Iraq except with a United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) patrol as escort and with the prior approval of the UNIKOM Command for such patrol activities.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1058
15 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

My Government must express its strong disagreement with the position expressed by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the letter from Prime Minister Radoje Kontić of 12 September 1994 (S/1994/1045, annex).

The letter constitutes unacceptable meddling in the internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia, a sovereign State Member of the United Nations. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) is continuing to act in a way contrary to international law and it is blatantly ignoring Security Council resolutions 815 (1992), 847 (1993), 871 (1993) and 908 (1994). The letter is also a violation of the spirit of the final documents of the Rome meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (S/26843), which call for reintegration of the United Nations protected areas into the political and legal system of Croatia and for mutual recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and Croatia.

We must emphasize that the decision about the future of the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Croatia is an exclusive domain of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Parliament; an undeniable right granted to Croatia by the Charter of the United Nations.

The issue of the Serb ethnic community in Croatia, part of which lives in the UNPAs, is an internal problem of Croatia, which can be greatly served by prompt recognition of Croatia by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Recognition will expedite the solution-seeking process. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) should be aware of various bilateral and multilateral mechanisms and standards, such as reciprocity, which address the issue of national groups outside State borders. But these proven mechanisms can be utilized only once mutual recognition is achieved.

Any denial that the occupied territories in Croatia, the UNPAs, are an integral and sovereign part of Croatia is an attempt to politicize what has become international law. Therefore, my Government is at loss of logic when Prime Minister Kontić uses the term "politicize". Security Council resolutions 815 (1992), 847 (1993), 871 (1993) and 908 (1994) clearly confirm that the UNPAs are sovereign territory of Croatia. Moreover, Croatia has been recognized within its prewar borders by 107 States Members of the United Nations.

The members of the Council will agree that the aforementioned resolutions establish a foundation for a political settlement on the question of the UNPAs and that the Vance plan (S/23280, annex III) establishes a mechanism by which a political settlement can be pursued and implemented.

My Government therefore welcomes the position of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) "that the Vance plan should be fully and consistently implemented", and wishes to recall the critical elements of the plan, which call for, inter alia, the following:

- (a) The UNPAs would be demilitarized as rapidly as possible (para. 7);
- (b) Military observers would be placed in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina adjacent to Croatia (para. 13);
- (c) UNPA police units would be formed, in proportions reflecting the national composition of the population that lived in the respective UNPAs before hostilities (para. 19);
- (d) All displaced persons would be returned to their homes in the UNPAs (para. 20).

The members of the Council will further agree that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continues to have substantial influence, real and political, over the activities of its proxies in the UNPAs, and this relationship cannot be condoned in considering options that would lead to full implementation of the Vance plan and that would find a final political settlement for the UNPAs.

Increasing evidence about interference of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the affairs of the Serb community in the UNPAs, through monetary, customs, commerce, educational and military integration, had compelled my Government to ask the General Assembly to consider the issue of occupation of these territories under item 151 of the provisional agenda of the forty-ninth regular session of the General Assembly.

We call on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) in the future to refrain from making statements regarding the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia as such statements are contrary to accepted norms of international behaviour and a violation of the spirit of the final documents of the Rome meeting of CSCE.

Once again, we wish to reiterate the position that the question of extending the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia is the sole domain of the Croatian Government and the Croatian Parliament, which will be considered by taking into account the accomplishments of UNPROFOR and the effects of the decision on the peace and stability in the region.

May I request your kind assistance in distributing this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1059
15 September 1994
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 12 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF BELGIUM TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Chargé d'affaires a.i. of Belgium to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Secretary-General and, with reference to his note verbale of 23 March 1994 (S/1994/392), has the honour to inform him that the Belgian Government, in accordance with paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 917 (1994) and regulation No. 1263/94 of the Council of the European Communities of 30 May 1994, which suspended certain economic and financial relations with Haiti, and decision No. 94/314/CECA of the representatives of the Governments of the States members of the European Union, meeting in the Council on 30 May 1994, which suspended certain economic and financial relations with Haiti, has decreed that:

The import to Belgium of all products originating in and coming from Haiti, the export to Haiti of all products originating in and coming from Belgium, as well as the transshipment of any products originating in, coming from or being sent to Haiti, shall require a licence.

Only the export and transshipment to Haiti of foodstuffs and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes shall not require a licence (Ministerial Decree of 27 July 1994, Moniteur belge of 26 August 1994).

The text of the Ministerial Decree is annexed hereto.*

* The text of this Decree is available for consultation in room S-3545.



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/1994/1060
16 September 1994

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 SEPTEMBER 1994 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF YUGOSLAVIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions of my Government, regarding the letter of
Ambassador Sacitbey of 7 September 1994 (S/1994/1038), I have the honour to
state the following.

If peace is to be achieved in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is necessary that
the Muslim side discontinue all offensive military operations against the Serb
positions, i.e. honour the cease-fire agreement.

The Muslim side should give up its request for the lifting of the arms
embargo against the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. Failure to do so would
result in war conflicts of large proportions which would not benefit any side.

The Muslim side, which together with the Croat side formally accepted the
plan of the Contact Group, should desist from political statements whose aim is
to deny the equality of the Serb people in the future union of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.

In that vein, the Muslim side, if it truly seeks peace and a just
settlement, must not discourage the Serb side by the statements that the Serbs
in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not entitled to the right to establish confederal
ties with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the same way as the Croat-
Muslim side is entitled to do with the Republic of Croatia.

Peace and a compromise settlement concerning the former Bosnia and
Herzegovina can be viable only if the Muslim leaders give up their plan for the
domination of the Croat-Muslim federation in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the
Serbs, i.e. if they give up the idea of creating any form of a unitary State in
the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

It is unacceptable that the Muslim side insists on the recognition of
Bosnia and Herzegovina within its present borders by the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia as a precondition for the lifting of the sanctions against the
latter. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia can recognize Bosnia and Herzegovina
only after a comprehensive peaceful solution, accepted by the three peoples in
this former Yugoslav republic, has been reached.

It is necessary that the Muslim side abandon baseless and incomprehensible allegations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia for the alleged breaches of Yugoslavia's decision to sever political and economic relations with the Republic of Srpska, i.e. the secret shipments of military equipment and oil to the Serbs in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina. At a time when the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is investing major efforts so that peace in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina can be achieved, such insinuations complicate the search of a final solution and raise doubts as to how truly the Muslims are interested in peace. As far as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's resolve to implement this decision is concerned, numerous and unambiguous statements of foreign diplomats provide ample evidence to that effect.

It is necessary that the Muslim side end its charges against the Serbs in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of alleged aggression against this former Yugoslav republic at a moment when key international factors state that a civil war is being waged in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Muslim side should condemn all forms of ethnic cleansing in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina wherever they occur. The Muslim side, as well as other sides in the former Bosnia and Herzegovina, is obliged to abandon immediately and completely the practice of ethnic cleansing.

As far as cooperation with the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia is concerned, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has taken a position that all war crimes are punishable in accordance with domestic legislation and the international conventions it has ratified. Consequently, the perpetrators of such crimes - the citizens of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - will be prosecuted by the competent domestic authorities. Any attempt to link the lifting of the sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with its recognition of the competence of the International Tribunal does not serve the purpose of punishing the war crimes but is aimed exclusively at strengthening political pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIC
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
